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The efﬁcacy of the management of long-term conditions depends in part on whether healthcare and
health behaviours are complements or substitutes in the health production function. On the one hand,
individuals might believe that improved health care can raise the marginal productivity of their own
health behaviour and decide to complement health care with additional effort in healthier behaviours.
On the other hand, health care can lower the cost of unhealthy behaviours by compensating for their
negative effects. Individuals may therefore reduce their effort in healthier lifestyles. Identifying which of
these effects prevails is complicated by the endogenous nature of treatment decisions and individuals’
behavioural responses. We explore whether the introduction in 2004 of the Quality and Outcomes
Framework (QOF), a ﬁnancial incentive for family doctors to improve the quality of healthcare, affected
the population’s weight, smoking and drinking behaviours by applying a sharp regression discontinuity
design to a sample of 32,102 individuals in the Health Survey for England (1997e2009). We ﬁnd that
individuals with the targeted health conditions improved their lifestyle behaviours. This complemen-
tarity was only statistically signiﬁcant for smoking, which reduced by 0.7 cigarettes per person per day,
equal to 18% of the mean. We investigate whether this change was attributable to the QOF by testing for
other discontinuity points, including the introduction of a smoking ban in 2007 and changes to the QOF
in 2006. We also examine whether medication and smoking cessation advice are potential mechanisms
and ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant discontinuities for these aspects of health care supply. Our results
suggest that a general improvement in healthcare generated by provider incentives can have positive
unplanned effects on patients’ behaviours.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Major non-communicable diseases are the primary cause of
death in developed countries. In Europe, the ﬁve major non-
communicable diseases (diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, cancer,
chronic respiratory diseases and mental disorders) account for 86%
of deaths (WHO Europe, 2012). These diseases are generally chronic
in nature, requiring long-term management. Best practice man-
agement and prevention uses both drug treatments and behaviour
change interventions targeting smoking, alcohol consumption, diet
and physical activity (NICE CG87, 2009; NICE CG181, 2014; NICE
NG28, 2015).
The efﬁcacy of this approach depends, in part, on whether
receiving health care inﬂuences a patient’s decisions to invest ink (E. Fichera).
r Ltd. This is an open access articlehealth behaviours. Economic models of health production propose
that both medical treatment and an individual’s health behaviours
are inputs in the production function for health capital (Becker,
2007; Grossman, 1972). The response of an individual to an in-
crease in treatment provided by the health service depends on
whether health care and health behaviours are substitutes or
complements in the health production function.
From the individual’s point of view, health behaviours are cho-
sen at the level where the marginal costs equal the marginal ben-
eﬁts of effort. Because healthcare is an additional input, the optimal
choice to the individual depends on what she believes about the
joint productivity of the two inputs. On the one hand, the individual
might believe that improved health care can raise the marginal
productivity of her own health behaviour and decide to comple-
ment health care with additional effort in healthier behaviours. On
the other hand, health care can lower the cost of unhealthy be-
haviours by compensating for their negative effects. Individuals
may therefore reduce their effort in undertaking healthierunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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one prevails over the other.
Kaestner et al. (2014) used a Becker-type health production
model (Grossman, 1972) with multiple types of health investment
to examine the effect of a reduction in the price of statins on health
behaviours. Their model predicted an ambiguous relationship be-
tween statins and health behaviours. The direction of the effect
depends on whether the pure income effect, leading to more con-
sumption of both statins and healthier behaviours, prevails over the
substitution effect.
Investigation of the causal effect of health care on health be-
haviours is difﬁcult in observational settings because treatment is
not assigned randomly. Disease, and the causes of disease, deter-
mine treatment assignment and may also inﬂuence health behav-
iours. Health behaviours inﬂuence disease occurrence and
therefore treatment assignment, creating a selection bias if we
compare treated and untreated samples.
A few studies have used instrumental variable models to over-
come the treatment endogeneity problem. Kaestner et al. (2014)
used the gradual penetration of statins in the U.S. market since
their introduction in 1987 as an instrument for statin use. They
used the Framingham Heart Study and found that statin use was
associated with a small increase in Body Mass Index (BMI) and
larger increases in the probability of being obese. They found that
an increase in statins was associated with a 0.3e0.5 point increase
in BMI for females and males and an increase of 15% of the mean in
moderate alcohol consumption by males. Their results provide
evidence for a strong substitutability of healthier behaviours and
healthcare. However, they found no consistent evidence of a
decrease in smoking as a result of statin use.
Fichera and Sutton (2011) used three cross-sections of the
Health Survey for England to determine the effect of lipid-lowering
drugs and smoking cessation advice on quitting smoking behav-
iour. In a trivariate probit regression they adopted an exclusion
restriction involving the individual’s level of cholesterol and type of
heart disease. They found that prescription of lipid-lowering drugs
increased the probability of smoking cessation by 20e28 percent-
age points in patients with cardiovascular diseases. However, the
assumption of no direct effect of the type of heart disease on
behaviour was not testable in cross-sectional data.
Schneider and Ulrich (2008) used two waves of the German
Socio-Economic Panel Study to investigate the relation between the
number of doctor visits and a patient’s BMI and smoking behaviour.
Although they found complementarity between the visits to the
doctor and health behaviours, their identiﬁcation strategy relied on
a number of instruments (speciﬁcally stress, economic worries and
a regional dummy for living in East Germany) to affect health be-
haviours but not healthcare utilisation.
In this paper we exploit an exogenous change in the provision of
health care. This was caused by a change in the ﬁnancial incentives
for family doctors to provide treatment. These highly powered in-
centives, the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), were initi-
ated in April 2004 and aimed to improve the quality of primary care
through ﬁnancial rewards for achievement against a number of
indicators of health care provision and health outcomes. We
observe the effects of the QOF using data from the Health Survey for
England (HSE) (1997e2009). This household survey gathers data on
health behaviours and health status from repeated cross-sections of
the English population.
We exploit the known date of introduction of the QOF with a
regression discontinuity approach. We address treatment endoge-
neity in two ways: i) the introduction of the QOF induces a step
change in treatment that is independent of individual’s behaviour;
and ii) as the interview date is independent of the QOF and the
sample is randomly drawn from the population, so are theunobserved attitudes towards health of these individuals.
A systematic review by Gillam et al. (2012) reported that the
QOF improved care quality with enhanced processes and inter-
mediate outcomes formost of the health conditions that it targeted.
In a Becker-type model such as the one by Grossman (1972), the
value of a marginal investment in healthier behaviours has
increased, because improved health care induces a higher proba-
bility of survival to enjoy the beneﬁts. This is similar to the
“competing risk of death effect” described by Kaestner et al. (2014).
However, if healthcare and health behaviours are substitutes in
health production then the model predicts lower investments in
healthier behaviours. Kaestner et al. (2014) label this the “technical
substitution effect”. Therefore, the effect of the QOF-induced in-
crease in the supply of healthcare on health behaviours is an
empirical question.
We examine the effect of the QOF on three health behaviours
(BMI, smoking and alcohol consumption) in a population of in-
dividuals with health conditions targeted by the QOF. We ﬁnd ev-
idence of complementarity between healthcare and healthier
lifestyle choices with a statistically signiﬁcant average reduction of
0.7 cigarettes per person per day (equivalent to 18% of the mean).
We expose our analysis to a battery of robustness checks investi-
gating the sensitivity of the results to the deﬁnition of the
discontinuity point. Our main results remain unchanged.
We then attempt to determine some potential mechanisms
through which the QOF has improved lifestyle behaviours exam-
ining the role of medication and smoking cessation advice, which
are both measured in the HSE. We do not ﬁnd any statistically
signiﬁcant discontinuities in medication and smoking cessation
advice. This suggests that it was the wider improvements in health
care induced by the QOF identiﬁed in previous studies (see for
example, Gillam et al., 2012; and Sutton et al., 2010) that may have
inﬂuenced individual’s health behaviours.
The paper is structured as follows. The QOF is described in
section 2. The data and descriptive statistics are outlined in section
3. Section 4 contains a graphical analysis. Section 5 describes the
empirical strategy and section 6 discusses the results. Section 7
concludes.
2. The Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF)
On the 1st of April 2004, the UK National Health Service intro-
duced a new pay-for-performance scheme for family doctors. This
new program, the QOF, encouraged improved treatment and
management of speciﬁc conditions and increased doctors’ incomes
by 25% (Review Body, 2008).
Each ﬁnancial year running from 1st of April, practices are
rewarded on four quality domains: clinical, organisational, addi-
tional services and patient experience (Roland, 2004). Each domain
contains several quality indicators. Achievement of these indicators
provides practices with points, which are converted to income
depending on the size of the practice population and disease
prevalence rates. In the ﬁrst two ﬁnancial years of the program, the
clinical domain contained up to 550 points. In 2004/05 the price
per point was £75, offering a maximum of about £41,250 for an
average practice. In 2005/06 the price per point was raised to £125
amounting to a maximum income of £68,750.
In this paper we consider seven disease areas and18 perfor-
mance indicators present in the QOF since its introduction in 2004/
05 (see description in Table A.1). These indicators accounted for 25%
(139/550 points) of the total reward available for clinical care up to
2005/06. Although from the 1st of April 2006 the total number of
QOF points changed as new indicators were introduced, the pro-
portion of total points available for our incentivised indicators re-
mains unchanged.
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conditions such as asthma, high blood pressure, coronary heart
diseases, diabetes, stroke and mental health. Amongst directly
incentivised activities, the QOF includes recording of smoking and
BMI (for asthma and diabetes) and the provision of smoking
cessation advice. In the period we consider there was no direct
incentive for reducing alcohol consumption or BMI. However, NICE
guidelines on management of cardiovascular diseases and diabetes
include nutritional advice, and other behavioural change in-
terventions relating to reduction of alcohol and cigarette con-
sumption (NICE CG87, 2009; NICE CG181, 2014; NICE NG28, 2015).
It is reasonable to suppose that in striving to meet QOF indicators in
these conditions providers may more consistently apply best
practice management and not only improve directly incentivised
treatments.
Most of the literature on the impact of the QOF reports that the
program improved quality in the targeted clinical areas, but after
2005/06 it reached a plateau (see for example, Campbell et al., 2009
and Doran et al., 2011). However, almost all of the literature on the
effects of the QOF relies on data recorded and/or reported by
practices and is therefore susceptible to changes in recording
behaviour and/or reporting bias (see Gravelle et al., 2010). There is
very little evidence on how the QOF has affected patients, partic-
ularly with respect to their health behaviours and their health
outcomes (Gillam et al., 2012; Sutton et al., 2010). But this is an
important policy issue as the effects of provider incentives may be
crowded-out by deteriorations in individuals’ health behaviours.
3. Data and descriptive statistics
The Health Survey for England (HSE) comprises annual cross-
sectional surveys beginning in 1991 and contains information on
diagnoses, health behaviours and prescribed medicines. It is
designed to be nationally representative of the English adult pop-
ulation with regard to age, gender, geographic area and socio-
demographic circumstances. We use twelve years of data from
1997, after which income information was collected. We did not
require ethical approval for this study as we use anonymised,
publicly available observational data on individuals.
The HSE contains a “core” sample that is repeated each year and
a “boost” sample on subjects of special interest that vary each year.
The “core” part includes questions on general health and psycho-
social indicators, smoking, alcohol, demographic and socio-
economic indicators. The HSE contains information on the medi-
cines that individuals have been prescribed. Respondents are asked
whether they are taking any prescribed medication and, if so, the
British National Formulary codes of all medications are recorded by
the nurse from the packets or bottles. We consider prescription of
any drug that is directly incentivised in the QOF for the targeted
conditions. As listed in Table A.1, the drugs directly incentivised in
the QOF and recorded in the HSE are: lipid-lowering drugs, di-
uretics, beta-blockers, vasodilators, calcium blockers, anticoagu-
lants and anti-platelet drugs. Smokers in the HSE are asked
whether they have been given smoking cessation advice by a
medical practitioner and if so, whether such advice was delivered
within the past 12 months. As the smoking cessation variable was
not recorded in 2000, 2001 and 2002, we use amultiple imputation
procedure to account for missing observations (Rubin, 1987). We
perform three sensitivity tests on the imputation models by
excluding any time trend, by including a linear time trend and,
ﬁnally, by including a second order polynomial of the time trend.
More details on this process are available from the authors on
request.
In each year of the “boost” sample, the HSE focuses on speciﬁc
demographic groups and health conditions. In each year of thesurvey sampling weights are provided for the over-representation
of speciﬁc boost samples compared to the overall population (see
HSE, 2006). We have rescaled these sampling weights by the mean
of the weight in each year.
We select a sample of individuals reporting at least one condi-
tion incentivised by the QOF. The health conditions recorded in the
HSE related to the seven disease areas targeted by the QOF are:
cancer, diabetes, other endocrine problems, mental health, stroke,
heart attack/angina, hypertension/high blood pressure, bronchitis,
asthma, and other respiratory problems. See Table A.1 for a full
description of the disease areas and indicators incentivised by the
QOF. The survey contains information on health outcomes and
behaviours. We focus on BMI, the average number of cigarettes
smoked per day and the frequency of alcohol drinking because they
are the only health behaviours consistentlymeasured across survey
waves. BMI is deﬁned as the individual’s body mass (in kilograms)
divided by the square of her height (in metres). It is the net of
energy intake (diet) and energy expenditure (determined by
physical activity and other metabolic factors). We believe it is more
relevant to use BMI as a proxy for diet and physical activity because
it reﬂects energy balance. This makes it a good proxy of diet and
exercise behaviours. For the analysis of BMI, we include only
feasible values and trim the bottom and top 5% of the distribution.
In each wave of the survey, respondents are asked whether they
smoke and, if so, the average number of cigarettes smoked in a day.
Non-smokers are coded as having zero consumption of cigarettes
per day.
HSE respondents are also asked about the frequency of their
alcohol drinking. Responses range from a scale of one (i.e. once
every couple of months or once/twice per year) to ﬁve (i.e. almost
every day). We dichotomise this variable with a value of one for
daily alcohol consumption and zero for any other frequency of
consumption. One limitation of our analysis is that we only have
measures of the frequency and not the intensity of alcohol con-
sumption (Berggren and Sutton, 1999).
As covariates we include demographic variables, education, re-
gion of residence, and income. The demographic variables include
gender, age, number of children, and marital status. We also
consider an indicator of formal education. Household income is
equivalised by household size and deﬂated using the consumer
price index with 2005 as the base year.
Table 1 displays comparisons of health behaviours and indi-
vidual characteristics two years before and after the QOF was
introduced. We choose a relatively small interval around the
introduction of the QOF in order to test the assumption that in-
dividuals to the left and right of the cut-off date are similar in their
baseline covariates. Later on, we will show that the optimal band-
width is indeed around two years. We have also tested the equality
of means at one and three years. These results are not displayed
here, but can be made available by the authors upon request.
After the QOF was introduced we ﬁnd that respondents smoke
on average half a cigarette less per day than those interviewed
before the QOF.
Most of the individual characteristics are not statistically
different before and after the QOF was introduced. However, we
ﬁnd that on average patients interviewed after the QOF was
introduced have higher incomes than those interviewed before.We
also ﬁnd that after the QOF there are a higher proportion of patients
who are not single. In order to reduce biases from imbalances
amongst individuals at large intervals from either side of the cut-
off, we control for such characteristics in our empirical strategy.
4. Graphical analyses
We start our analysis with a visualisation of the (potential)
Table 1
Comparisons of outcomes and covariates before and after the introduction of the QOF
Before After p-value of difference N
Outcomes
Cigarettes smoked per day 3.80 3.20 0.004*** 10,924
Drinking alcohol dailyy 0.24 0.24 0.916 9804
Body mass index (kg/m2) 26.9 27.0 0.265 8978
Covariates
Femaley 0.53 0.54 0.863 13,330
Age 55.8 55.9 0.731 13,330
Formal educational qualiﬁcationy 0.64 0.62 0.374 11,236
Children 0.37 0.33 0.403* 11,236
Cohabiting/ever marriedy 0.59 0.61 0.033** 11,236
Ln(equivalised income) 9.72 9.78 <0.001*** 11,236
Notes: Sample sizes of the covariates is the maximum attainable when both cigarette consumption and any of the covariates are not missing. Sample size of the outcome
variables is conditional on that speciﬁc outcome variable not containing missing values. Survey weights applied. p-values are obtained from t-tests on the equality of means.
y0/1 dummy variable. Samples are within two years before andwithin two years after the introduction of the QOF. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05 *p < 0.10 of difference of means before
and after.
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QOF. In order to do so, we take the average of the outcome variables
for each bin:
Y ¼ 1
Nk
XN
i¼1
YiIðbk <Xi  bkþ1Þ
where Y indicates the health behaviours, N indicates the total
number of observations and k bins of equal width are deﬁned along
a range of X interview dates. We use the interview date to deﬁne a
bin as a single ﬁnancial year. On average each bin contains about
2840 observations. There is a trade-off in the choice of bins size as
bins that are smaller will have a higher variance but less bias.
Each panel of Fig. 1 plots Y for k ¼ 1,…, K against the mid-point
of the bins ~bk ¼ ðbk þ bkþ1Þ=2, as suggested by Imbens and
Lemieux (2008). The ﬁrst panel on the left of Fig. 1 clearly dis-
plays a downward jump in the average number of cigarettes
smoked per day after the QOF was introduced. There is no clear
evidence of any change in BMI or alcohol drinking at this point. In
Figures A.1e2 we report the sensitivity of discontinuities to bins
that are 3 months and 6 months wide and the results are similar to
those in Fig. 1.
Our further analysis seeks to determine whether the reduction
in cigarettes smoking observed in Fig. 1 is coincident with the QOF-
induced improvement in care.
5. Empirical strategy
In order to estimate the effect of the QOF on health behaviours,
we use a regression discontinuity design (RDD). This is a variation
of the interrupted time series design adopted by Kontopantelis
et al. (2014) to examine the effect of the QOF on the quality of
primary care for targeted conditions. We argue that better primary
care induced by the QOF for people with targeted conditions might
induce behavioural changes in their lifestyle choices. Patients with
targeted conditions at the margin receive more and better quality
treatment after the QOF. These marginal patients might decide to
complement or substitute additional treatment with healthier
lifestyle choices.
The basic idea behind RDD is that the intervention (i.e. the QOF)
is a discontinuous function of a “forcing” variable (i.e. date of
interview) being on either side of a ﬁxed cut-off (i.e. the date of
introduction of the QOF). To exploit discontinuities in the policy
assignment, we assert that individuals on either side of the cut-off
are essentially the same in the unobservables or confounders that
affect health behaviours. In other words, the unobservable factors
(e.g. attitudes towards health) that affect health behaviours are notcorrelated with the policy itself. This is not an unreasonable
assumption in our case as the interview date is not related to the
introduction of the policy and the samples are drawn randomly
from the national population. Within a sufﬁciently close interval of
the cut-off, conditional on the observed characteristics, the only
difference is that people with targeted conditions receive improved
treatment after the QOF.
We use a Sharp RD (SRD) design because the intervention ap-
plies to all individuals with targeted conditions. We can deﬁne:
Di ¼

1 if xi  c
0 if xi < c
(1)
where c indicates 1st April 2004, the cut-off point; and xi is the HSE
respondent’s date of interview. In the SRD design the assignment to
the intervention Di is a deterministic function of the forcing vari-
able xi. We apply both a non-parametric and a parametric method
to the SRD design, as suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010). These
two methods should be used as complements not substitutes to
each other.
5.1. Non-parametric method
The ﬁrst method is based on a local linear regression around the
discontinuity. Assume our model is:
Yi ¼ aþ tDi þ bf ðxiÞ þ εi with Di ¼ 1:½xi  c (2)
where Yi are the health behaviour measures. Since the “forcing”
variable xi completely determines whether individual i is treated,
the conditional means are:
mlðxÞ ¼ limx[c E½Yð0Þjxi ¼ c and mrðxÞ ¼ limxYc E½Yð1Þjxi ¼ c
obtained from two local linear regressions, each at the right, r, and
left, l, side of the cut-off. The SRD design estimator btSRD ¼ bmr  bml is
obtained using standard nonparametric regression methods:
bmlðxÞ ¼
P
i:chxi < cYi*Kh

xic
h

P
i:chxi < cKh

xic
h
 and
bmrðxÞ ¼
P
i:c< xichYi*Kh

xic
h

P
i:c< xichKh

xic
h

(3)
where ðxi  cÞ is the “running” variable deﬁned as the distance of
individual i to the date of introduction of the QOF. Kh ¼ h1Kð:Þ is a
Fig. 1. graphical analysis of changes in outcome variables at the introduction of the QOF. Weighted sample. Each dot indicates the unconditional sample mean for a ﬁnancial year.
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h ¼ hðnÞ is a bandwidth parameter determining the width of the
kernel. In our empirical speciﬁcation we use a simple triangular
Kernel, e.g. KðuÞ ¼ ð1 jujÞ1fjuj1g. There are more sophisticated
Kernel functions determining weights that decrease smoothly as
the distance to the cut-off increases, instead of the 0/1 weights of
the triangular kernel. As pointed out by Imbens and Lemieux
(2008) results sensitive to more sophisticated kernels are also
sensitive to different bandwidths. Therefore, they suggest focusing
on the simple triangular kernel and verify the robustness of the
results to different choices of bandwidths. This is the approach we
take in our analysis. The bigger the sample size, the smaller the
weight to observations further from the cut-off. The optimal
bandwidth is chosen with the procedure used by Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2009). The estimation has been performed using
the rd command in Stata (Austin, 2011).
The SRD design allows us to estimate the average treatment
effect of the QOF on health behaviours. The crucial identifying
assumption for using individuals with targeted conditions inter-
viewed after the QOF as a valid counterfactual for individuals with
targeted conditions interviewed before the QOF is that both
E½Yð0Þjxi and E½Yð1Þjxi are continuous in xi at c. In other words, this
means that all unobserved determinants of health behaviours are
continuously related to the forcing variable xi.5.2. Parametric approach
The second method uses the full sample before and after the
QOF was introduced with a polynomial regression in which the
equivalent of the bandwidth choice is the choice of the correct
polynomial order (see Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
The polynomial regression can be estimated as a pooled OLS
regression on both sides of the cutoff point:
Yi ¼ aþ tDi þ b1
Xm
j¼1
f mðxi  cÞ þ b1
2
4Di*Xm
j¼1
f mðxi  cÞ
3
5þ εi
(4)
wherem¼ 1,2,3 is the order of the polynomial. We report a number
of speciﬁcations with different polynomial orders to illustrate the
robustness of our results. We use the Akaike Information Criterion
for model selection.
5.3. Robustness checks
As the continuity assumption of the RDD is not testable, we
follow Lee and Lemieux (2010) in using two indirect tests for the
validity of this method.
First, we examine whether the observed baseline covariates are
“locally” balanced on either side of the cut-off. Intuitively, if RDD is
valid, the intervention cannot inﬂuence variables not determined
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composition of respondents). Here we test the assumption of zero
effects on those baseline characteristics using the polynomial
regression described above with the inclusion of the same control
variables used throughout this paper. As a placebo test, we run two
separate OLS models just like model (4), but with Y being age and
gender as functions of several covariates.
The second validity test looks for jumps at non-discontinuity
points. The approach here is similar to the treatment effect litera-
ture, as we test for a zero effect in a period whenwe know the effect
should be zero (see Imbens, 2004). We follow Imbens and Lemieux
(2008) and perform the ﬁrst test as follows. We calculate the me-
dian of each sub-sample at either side of the cut-off. The median is
three years for the sub-sample before the cut-off and 2.4 years for
the sub-sample after 1st April 2004. Imbens and Lemieux (2008)
suggest the use of the median as a way to increase the power of
the test. A “virtual” policy dummy variable indicates for each sub-
sample whether observations are above or below the median.
This validity test consists of establishing whether the “virtual”
policy dummy is statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero in a
set of OLS regressions of the outcome variables. This is why this
method is often referred to as the “falsiﬁcation” or “placebo” test.
As new indicators were introduced in the QOF and thresholds of
achievements were changed from 1st April 2006, we use this
revision of the program as an additional potential discontinuity
point and repeat the analysis of sub-section 5.2. The assumption is
that the introduction of new indicators although unrelated to our
targeted groups might have generated a shift in individuals’ be-
haviours. In addition, a smoking ban came into force in England on
1st July 2007 making it illegal to smoke in enclosed public places.
Evidence on the effectiveness of smoking bans on active smoking is
rather mixed (Callinan et al., 2010). We test whether this reform
affects cigarette consumption.
As an additional sensitivity analysis, we investigate whether our
results are robust to the inclusion of regions which are only
consistently classiﬁed from 1998. We also examine whether the
reduction in cigarette consumption is driven at the extensive
(through quitting) or intensive (through a reduction in consump-
tion amongst smokers) margins.
Finally, the introduction of the QOF has induced improvements
in the quality of care for targeted conditions through many aspects
of the primary care services (i.e. monitoring of the condition,
increased contacts with the doctor, prescribing, lifestyle advice
etc.). Some of these services are directly targeted by the policy and
some are recorded in the HSE. Table A.1 reports two types of
treatment incentivised by the QOF and recorded in the HSE for this
population group: prescription of medication and provision of
smoking cessation advice. We investigate whether medication and
cessation advice jump at the discontinuity point.
6. Results
For each health behaviour reported in Table 2, we display ﬁve
models with different bandwidths: one for the optimal bandwidth;
two for multiples of the optimal bandwidth greater than one; and
two for multiples of the optimal bandwidth smaller than one. We
show that the improvement in primary care quality induced by the
QOF is associated with healthier lifestyle behaviours. At the optimal
bandwidth we ﬁnd a decrease in the probability that people with
QOF targeted conditions drink every day, a small reduction in BMI
(0.8% of the mean) and a reduction in cigarette smoking, but only
the latter is statistically signiﬁcant. The magnitude of the average
treatment effect on people with QOF targeted conditions is a
reduction of approximately 0.7 cigarettes per person per day
(approximately an 18% decline of the mean). We replicate theanalysis for multiples of the optimal bandwidth and the results are
very similar (with a decline of between 16% and 21% of the mean).
The statistical signiﬁcance at narrower bandwidths is weaker
because of the (sub-optimally) smaller sample size.
For each health behaviour reported in Table 3, we display two
models: one for the best polynomial order and one for the second-
best polynomial order. Using the Akaike Information Criterion
values we select the ﬁrst and second polynomial orders for BMI
(AIC ¼ 137060.6 and AIC ¼ 137060.8, respectively); the second and
third polynomial orders for alcohol drinking (AIC ¼ 29022.95 and
AIC¼ 29024.35, respectively); and the third and second polynomial
orders for cigarettes smoking (AIC ¼ 214921.3 and AIC ¼ 214926,
respectively).
The parametric models conﬁrm a statistically signiﬁcant reduc-
tion in cigarette smoking. The magnitude of the average treatment
effect ranges between a decline of 0.69 and 0.92 cigarettes per
person per day. The coefﬁcient of the parametric regression is
slightly different from the non-parametric regression due tomissing
values for some of the additional covariates (i.e. education, income,
marital status and number of children). The inclusion of these
covariates is advisable when the parametric regression is estimated
over the full sample. As additional sensitivity checks to the para-
metric regression, we have included just age and gender, and then
also all the covariates including regional dummies (consistently
available in the HSE from 1998). We have found the coefﬁcient to be
very similar to the coefﬁcient in the non-parametric regression.
These results are available from the authors upon request.
The results of the ﬁrst robustness check conﬁrm that the
observed baseline covariates are “locally” balanced on either side of
the cut-off. There is no statistically signiﬁcant effect of the QOF on
age or gender at any of the displayed polynomial orders. At the
optimal polynomial order the effect of the QOF on age is0.28 (with
standard error 0.78) and on female is 0.01 (with standard error 0.02).
The second validity test looks for jumps at other potential
discontinuity points. The results presented in Table 4 show no
statistically signiﬁcant effect for placebo reforms.
Other potential discontinuity points could have been changes in
the structure of the QOF introduced from 1st April 2006 and the
introduction of the smoking ban in England on the 1st of July 2007.
In Table 5 we report the effect of the QOF policy change in 2006 on
each health behaviour (Model I) and the effect of the smoking ban
in 2007 on the number of cigarettes smoked (Model II). Polynomial
regressions report no statistically signiﬁcant effect of the QOF on
health behaviours around an interval of the 1st April 2006. Even on
the date of the smoking ban in England there is no statistically
signiﬁcant change in smoking behaviour. This conﬁrms results by
Jones et al. (2015) using the British Household Panel Survey.
We investigate whether the reduction in smoking is apparent at
the extensive or intensive margins. Whilst we ﬁnd no evidence of a
statistically signiﬁcant reduction in the number of cigarettes
smoked by the smokers, we ﬁnd some evidence of a three per-
centage point increase in the probability of not smoking. The lack of
statistical signiﬁcance on the intensive margin might be driven by
the smaller sample, which only includes smokers.
Finally, we investigate potential mechanisms through which the
QOF policy might be associated with changes in healthier lifestyle
choices (see Table 6). Medication and smoking cessation advice are
two of themechanisms that are directly incentivised by the QOF and
are measured in the HSE.We ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant effect of
the QOF onwhether respondents in the HSE sample reported being
prescribed medication or receiving smoking cessation advice.
7. Conclusions
We ﬁnd evidence that the introduction of the QOF in April 2004
Table 2
Estimates of the effect of the QOF on health behaviours using local linear regression.
BMI Alcohol No. cigarettes
Coeff. N. Coeff. N. Coeff. N.
Model I:
With the optimal bandwidth 0.22 (0.19) 11,270 0.01 (0.02) 9101 0.70** (0.28) 19,663
Model II:
With 1.5 times the optimal bandwidth 0.18 (0.16) 16,441 0.003 (0.02) 14,119 0.67*** (0.23) 27,269
Model III:
With twice the optimal bandwidth 0.09 (0.13) 21,397 0.01 (0.02) 17,883 0.62*** (0.21) 32,102
Model IV:
With 0.3 times the optimal bandwidth 0.41 (0.35) 3482 0.01 (0.04) 2415 0.84* (0.49) 5500
Model V:
With 0.4 times the optimal bandwidth 0.26 (0.31) 4660 0.001 (0.04) 3203 0.83* (0.43) 7628
Note: optimal bandwidths are as follows: for BMI hopt ¼ 2.5 years; for alcohol hopt ¼ 1.9 years; for cigarettes hopt ¼ 3.4 years. Std. errors in (). Weighted sample. All equations
control for age and gender.***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
Table 3
Estimates of the effect of the QOF on health behaviours using polynomial regression.
BMI Alcohol No. cigarettes
Coeff. N. Coeff. N. Coeff. N.
Model I:
With best polynomial order 0.01 (0.11) 25,152 0.02 (0.02) 27,467 0.92** (0.37) 31,383
Model II:
With second-best polynomial order 0.18 (0.17) 25,152 0.004 (0.02) 27,467 0.69*** (0.19) 31,383
Std. errors in (). Weighted sample. All equations control for age, age squared, gender, educational qualiﬁcation, number of children, marital status and income.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05.
Table 4
Test for jumps at placebo discontinuity points.
Before After
Body mass index (kg/m2) 0.69 (0.26) 0.86 (1.11)
No. observations 15,775 9239
Proportion drinking alcohol daily 0.03 (0.03) 0.04 (0.11)
No. observations 16,775 10,551
Cigarettes smoked per person per day 0.11 (0.48) 1.04 (1.77)
No. observations 19,079 12,145
Weighted sample. Std errors in (). Table reports the coefﬁcients on dummy variables
in an OLS regression indicating two discontinuity points at themedian of the sample
on either side of the cut-off, namely 3 years before and 2.4 years after the intro-
duction of the QOF. All regressions include: a linear function of month of interview,
and its interaction with the placebo reform dummy, and age, age squared, gender,
educational qualiﬁcation, number of children, marital status and income.
Table 5
Estimates of the effect of other policies on health behaviours using polynomial regressio
BMI
Coeff. N.
Model I:
Changes to the QOF in 2006 0.05 (0.12) 25,152
Model II:
Smoking ban in 2007 e
Note: results refer to best polynomial order. Std. errors in (). Weighted sample. All equatio
marital status and income.
Table 6
Estimates of the effect of the QOF on treatments using polynomial regression.
Medication
Coeff.
Model I:
With best polynomial order 0.04 (0.04)
Model II:
With second-best polynomial order 0.02 (0.03)
Std. errors in (). Weighted sample. All equations control for age, age squared, gender, ed
E. Fichera et al. / Social Science & Medicine 159 (2016) 170e179176is associated with a reduction in BMI, frequency of alcohol drinking
and cigarette smoking. This effect was only statistically signiﬁcant
for smoking with a reduction of about 0.7 cigarettes per person per
day, an 18% decline in mean consumption among the population of
individuals reporting conditions targeted by the QOF. This is an
expected result given the higher-powered incentives for doctors to
treat these individuals and the high health returns to quitting
smoking for this population. This complementarity effect of
smokingwith health care conﬁrms that found by other studies such
as Fichera and Sutton (2011) and Schneider and Ulrich (2008). One
explanation for this result is that the value of amarginal investment
in healthier behaviours is increased because improvements in
primary care induced by the QOF generated a higher probability of
survival to enjoy the beneﬁts. This is similar to the “competing risk
of death effect” described by Kaestner et al. (2014) and is consistentn.
Alcohol No. cigarettes
Coeff. N. Coeff. N.
0.03 (0.02) 27,467 0.13 (0.27) 31,383
e 0.25 (0.44) 31,383
ns control for age, age squared, gender, educational qualiﬁcation, number of children,
Smoking cessation advice
N. Coeff. N.
23,346 0.02 (0.02) 21,418
23,346 0.0004 (0.01) 21,418
ucational qualiﬁcation, number of children, marital status and income.
E. Fichera et al. / Social Science & Medicine 159 (2016) 170e179 177with a Becker-type model such as Grossman (1972) with multiple
types of health investment.
The improvements in care induced by the QOF for individuals
with the targeted health conditions might include better moni-
toring of the condition, increased contacts with the doctor,
healthcare, and lifestyle advice. A limitation of our analysis is that
we cannot determine exactly which intervention incentivised by
the QOF induced a change in smoking behaviour. We have explored
potential mechanisms by examining the effect of the QOF on pre-
scription and smoking cessation advice and we have not found any
statistically signiﬁcant evidence of discontinuities for these aspects
of healthcare supply. One potential limitation is that we had to
impute smoking cessation advice, but we do not think this is
problematic as the data shows a consistent linear upward trend in
the provision of smoking cessation advice both before the year
2000 and after 2002. Our imputationwould be invalid if therewas a
sudden dip in 2000 that then quickly recovered back to the upward
trend from 2003 onward. However, more complex causal pathways
such as changing social norms around smoking may have inﬂu-
enced results. Social norms may be driving both the policy, e.g. the
choice of QOF indicators, and the behavioural response. Although
we cannot directly control for changes in social norms, these effects
might be captured, at least in part, by the time trends.
The broad range of effects of the QOF, including unintended
spillovers on general practice confounds identiﬁcation of the
mechanisms. Doran et al. (2011) ﬁnd that performance improved in
22 out of 23 incentivised clinical indicators. There is also evidence
for better recording of unincentivised activities. Sutton et al. (2010)
examined the effect of the QOF on recording of untargeted factors
(i.e. BMI and alcohol consumption) of patients with a targetedFig. A.1. Graphical analysis of changes in outcome variables at the introduction of the QOF (
mean for 3 months.disease. Using a difference in differences approach with data from
over 300 general practices in Scotland, they found substantial
spillovers with almost 11-percentage point increase in the
recording of untargeted factors induced by the QOF. Nevertheless,
despite the limitations regarding the identiﬁcation of the mecha-
nism, analysis of large-scale natural experiment is important. The
ﬁnancial resources of general practices were increased by 20e30%
(National Audit Ofﬁce, 2008). It is appropriate that we investigate
the effect of this major change on all aspects of population health.
The use of ﬁnancial incentives for health care providers has
raised concerns about the effects these will have on patient health
behaviours through a patient moral-hazard effect. The results of
this paper should alleviate concerns of undesirable crowding-out
effects of provider incentives onto individuals’ health behaviours.
Rather, they highlight the potential beneﬁts of positive spillovers of
such interventions.
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Appendix A. Additional resultsbin width ¼ 3 months). Weighted sample. Each dot indicates the unconditional sample
Table A.1
Description of the Quality and Outcomes Framework disease areas and treatments recorded in the Health Survey for England.
Indicator Description
ASTHMA
5
The percentage of patients with asthma who smoke, and whose notes contain a record that smoking cessation advice has been offered within last 15 months
ASTHMA
6
The percentage of patients with asthma who have had an asthma review in the last 15 months
BP3 The percentage of patients with hypertension who smoke, whose notes contain a record that smoking cessation advice has been offered at least once
BP4 The percentage of patients with hypertension in which there is a record of the blood pressure in the past 9 months
CHD4 The percentage of patients with coronary heart disease who smoke, whose notes contain a record that smoking cessation advice has been offered within the last
15 months
CHD7 The percentage of patients with coronary heart disease whose notes have a record of total cholesterol in the previous 15 months
CHD9 The percentage of patients with coronary heart disease with a record in the last 15months that aspirin, an alternative anti-platelet therapy, or an anti-coagulant
is being taken (unless a contraindication or side effects are recorded)
CHD10 The percentage of patients with coronary heart disease who are currently treated with a beta blocker (unless a contraindication or side-effects are recorded)
CHD11 The percentage of patients with a history of myocardial infarction (diagnosed after 1 April 2003) who are currently treated with an ACE inhibitor
DM2 The percentage of patients with diabetes whose notes record BMI in the previous 15 months
DM4 The percentage of patients with diabetes who smoke and whose notes contain a record that smoking cessation advice has been offered in the last 15 months
DM5 The percentage of diabetic patients who have a record of HbA1c or equivalent in the previous 15 months
DM15 The percentage of patients with diabetes with proteinuria or micro-albuminuria who are treated with ACE inhibitors (or A2 antagonists)
MH2 The percentage of patients with severe long-termmental health problems with a review recorded in the preceding 15 months. This review includes a check on
the accuracy of prescribed medication, a review of physical health and a review of co-ordination arrangements with secondary care
STROKE2 The percentage of new patients with presumptive stroke (presenting after 01/04/03) who have been referred for conﬁrmation of the diagnosis by CT or MRI
scan
STROKE4 The percentage of patients with a history of TIA or stroke who smoke and whose notes contain a record that smoking cessation advice has been offered in the
last 15 months
STROKE9 The percentage of patients with a stroke shown to be non-haemorrhagic, or a history of TIA, who have a record that aspirin, an alternative anti-platelet therapy,
or an anti-coagulant is being taken (unless a contraindication or side-effects are recorded)
Fig. A.2. Graphical analysis of changes in outcome variables at the introduction of the QOF (bin width ¼ 6 months). Weighted sample. Each dot indicates the unconditional sample
mean for 6 months.
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